of neurosis narrowed and became restricted to purely psychogenic disorders of no known anatomical cause. Psychosis then came to mean nonneurological (as distinct from dementia or epilepsy) disease of the brain. Psychoses were assumed to have a somatic cause that investigators could search for and ultimately discover. Neuroses were considered developmental processes that needed to be investigated in another way-they needed to be psychologically understood, one person at a time.
The connotation of the terms underwent several changes and, in 1980, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Third Edition, dispensed with them altogether, at least as they pertained to classification of illness. The term psychotic now referred to psychotic symptoms (for example, delusions and hallucinations), which can emerge in the context of many different disorders. One inference is that these particular symptoms have discoverable brain causes that can be found and eliminated, that trying to understand the meaning of these particular symptoms is like trying to understand the pain of a broken leg, not germane, in other words, to healing.
One school of thought, phenomenology, would still, however, consider the experience of such symptoms of paramount importance. Do delusions and hallucinations lead to cognitive chaos, to terror, amusement, fury, fascination, or preoccupation? Perhaps psychotic states can be best differentiated according to the patient's inner experience-perhaps only then will categories of psychic illness correspond to specific etiologies and specific treatments.
These thoughts are off topic. This book does not classify psychosis according to its effect on the patient. The classification used here is a traditional division of disorders: neurodevelopmental, neurodegenerative, focal, malignant, infectious, endocrine, metabolic, nutritional, autoimmune, and others in which psychotic symptoms can occur. The descriptions are thorough and take up 170 tightly written pages in Section 1. Section 2 deals with history and examination (including probe questions designed to elicit symptoms), investigations, clinical clues, and classification of psychoses of unknown origin. The book closes with an appendix on relevant changes proposed for DSM-5: new psychosis risk and olfactory reference syndromes, the omission of bizarre delusions and disorganized behaviour as criteria for schizophrenia, the abolition of schizophrenia subtypes and the category of shared psychotic disorder, the recognition that psychotic depression is not always severe depression, the collapse of Axes I, II, and II into one, relabelling of dementia, and reconsideration of catatonia. It will be interesting to see how many of these proposals will be approved. The schizophrenia risk syndrome has already been decided against.
This book is well-referenced, comprehensive, and up to date-an excellent reference book about the diagnosis of psychosis for all physicians, especially neurologists and psychiatrists. The title of this book intrigued me. As a physician and psychiatrist specializing in addiction, I have read about the promises of neuroscience research and eagerly anticipate a broader range of effective clinical applications. I must confess to have not given much thought about the perils of such research! The book is an updated version of a doctoral dissertation by the lead author, building on Dr Wayne Hall's interest in ethical, social, and policy issues. Dr Hall is the Director of the Addiction Neuroethics Unit at the University of Queensland.
Part 1 reviews "The Science of Addiction" and particularly the attempts to answer whether addicts are able to control their drug use. The neurobiological underpinnings include genetic research, molecular and cellular effects of drug use, and the functional neuroanatomical changes and their impact on cognition and decision making. The authors warn that neuroscientific approaches applied to a highly stigmatized condition could lead to unjustified invasive procedures, such as the reported experimental stereotactic ablations of the nucleus accumbens and cingulate gyrus in Russia and China. They also caution against the risks of deep brain stimulation or transcranial magnetic stimulation.
Part 2 reviews the principles of an ethical analysis and in particular the impact that addiction has on the autonomous decision-making capacity of people. The requirements of informed consent to treatment and the ethical acceptability of coerced treatment are explored. Neuroscience research does not prove that people who have addictions lack autonomy except for episodes of impairment, such as during withdrawal or intoxication. The aim of treatment should be to increase patient decision-making capacity.
Part 3 recognizes that, through neuroscience, treatments are more targeted to specific neurobiological deficits, with fewer side effects and may become more personalized. History is, however, littered with premature therapeutic enthusiasm. Novel anti-craving drugs, drug vaccines, depot medications, and drug implants could be abused by a public desiring to reduce social harm and punishing wrongdoers. In addition, silver bullets are regularly reported by the media in advance of properly conducted clinical trials. Recent examples include the promotion of ibogaine therapy and ultrarapid opioid detoxification. Somewhat Orwellian concerns are also raised about the undue optimism related to preventive genomic medicine and the risks of neuroenhancement.
Part 4 reviews the social and policy implications. The authors rightly assert that neuroscience research is unlikely to reduce the importance of public health drug control policies or the need for psychosocial initiatives. Ten themes are identified that elaborate on the critical importance of these initiatives. There are various social and moral forces that can drive how neuroscience advances are employed, thus shaping their effectiveness and the unintended harm they may cause. The authors also acknowledge that "as the science continues, some of the ethical issues identified may prove to be less serious then they now appear." p 258 Let's hope so.
Reviewing this book, I acquired an awareness of potential abuses of the expanding neuroscientific knowledge base. Recent examples of such risks demonstrate that this analysis is not merely an academic exercise but has, indeed, preventive applications. I am also left with some unease. Can ethics be devoid of bias? Concern has been expressed internationally and again in this book about the strategies promoted in the United States for addressing the public use and abuse of substances. The United States happens to support 85% of the global research funding in the field of addiction, mostly in support of a disease of the brain. This book is a wakeup call couched in ethical terms against the potential hegemony of this theory. However, there is no disclosure about the authors' own biases. There are also numerous omissions in the book, including no mention of the 12-step position on the powerlessness over alcohol, the recognized psychosocial ingredients of recovery, and the expanded insights derived from behavioural addictions. I recommend the book to a sophisticated audience that will be able to reach their own informed conclusions.
